Bonnie Straight;
Introduction to Writ of Quo Warranto

The Courts are not the Government and Have No Lawful Authority Over You.

All government offices are for-profit corporations and must have a corporate charter that is consistent with the Constitution. And all corporations are suable under Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs 436 U.S.658 (1978).

You can sue any corporation for their unconstitutional policies, patterns, and practices.

Are they depriving you of your due process rights?

How about a trial by jury?

Did they have a warrant with an affidavit showing probable cause? If they haven’t done that then we need to implode their Corporate Charter with a Writ of Quo Warranto.

In law, especially British and American common-law Quo Warranto is a prerogative writ requiring a person to whom it is directed to show what authority they have for exercising some right, power, or franchise they claim to hold.

Every corporate charter must be consistent with the United States Constitution. You have the choice to not contract with them if you don’t want to. You have a choice to contract with your doctor or not.

You can sue any corporation for their unconstitutional policies, patterns, and practices.

Did they have a warrant with an affidavit showing probable cause? Well if they haven’t done that and we need to implode their corporation with a Quo Warranto. Every corporate charter must be consistent the U.S. Constitution.

The courts cannot coerce contracts on you.

If you are compelled to go to court entered a notice of appearance.

Challenge standing and jurisdiction. Coercive slavery is a federal crime forbidden by 18 USC 1583,

18 U.S. Code § 1583 - Enticement into slavery
(a) Whoever—
(1) kidnaps or carries away any other person, with the intent that such other person be sold into involuntary servitude, or held as a slave;
(2) entices, persuades, or induces any other person to go on board any vessel or to any other place with the intent that he or she may be made or held as a slave, or sent out of the country to be so made or held; or
(3) obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
(b) Whoever violates this section shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both if—
(1) the violation results in the death of the victim; or
(2) the violation includes kidnaping, an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill.

18 U.S. Code § 1584 - Sale into involuntary servitude
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.
(b) Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be subject to the penalties described in subsection (a).

18 USC 1585 18 U.S. Code § 1585 - Seizure, detention, transportation or sale of slaves.
Whoever, being a citizen or resident of the United States and a member of the crew or ship’s company of any foreign vessel engaged in the slave trade, or whoever, being of the crew or ship’s company of any vessel owned in whole or in part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any citizen of the United States, lands from such vessel, and on any foreign shore seizes any person with intent to make that person a slave, or decoys, or forcibly brings, carries, receives, confines, detains or transports any person as a slave on board such vessel, or, on board such vessel, offers or attempts to sell any such person as a slave, or on the high seas or anywhere on tide water, transfers or delivers to any other vessel any such person with intent to make such person a slave, or lands or delivers on shore from such vessel any person with intent to sell, or having previously sold, such person as a slave, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.

It is a crime to force slavery.

Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

Argued November 2, 1977
Decided June 6, 1978
436 U.S. 658

Syllabus
Petitioners, female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the city of New York, brought this class action against the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor under 42 U.S.C. §1983,
[Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.] which provides that every "person" who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State subjects, or "causes to be subjected," any person to the deprivation of any federally protected rights, privileges, or immunities shall be civilly liable to the injured party. In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in their official capacities. The gravamen [the essence or most serious part of a complaint or accusation] of the complaint was that the Board and the Department had, as a matter of official policy, compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The District Court found that petitioners' constitutional rights had been violated, but held that petitioners' claims for injunctive relief were mooted by a supervening change in the official maternity leave policy. That court further held that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, barred recovery of back pay from the Department, the Board, and the city. In addition, to avoid circumvention of the immunity conferred by Monroe, the District Court held that natural persons sued in their official capacities as officers of a local government also enjoy the immunity conferred on local governments by that decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed on a similar theory.

Held:
1. In Monroe v. Pape, supra, after examining the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §1983, and particularly the rejection of the so-called Sherman amendment, the Court held that Congress, in 1871, doubted its constitutional authority to impose civil liability on municipalities, and therefore could not have intended to include municipal bodies within the class of "persons" subject to the Act. Reexamination of this legislative history compels the conclusion that Congress, in 1871, would not have thought §1983 constitutionally infirm if it applied to local governments. In addition, that history confirms that local governments were intended to be included.

Page 436 U. S. 659
among the "persons" to which §1983 applies. Accordingly, Monroe v. Pape is overruled insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit under §1983. Pp. 436 U. S. 664-689.

2. Local governing bodies (and local officials sued in their official capacities) can, therefore, be sued directly under §1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief in those situations where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy. In addition, local governments, like every other §1983 "person," may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such custom has not received formal approval through the government's official decisionmaking channels. Pp. 436 U. S. 690-691.

3. On the other hand, the language and legislative history of §1983 compel the conclusion that Congress did not intend a local government to be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- in other words, a local government cannot be held liable under §1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Pp. 436 U. S. 691-695.

4. Considerations of stare decisis do not counsel against overruling Monroe v. Pape insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion. Pp. 436 U. S. 695-701.

(a) Monroe v. Pape departed from prior practice insofar as it completely immunized municipalities from suit under §1983. Moreover, since the reasoning of Monroe does not allow a distinction to be drawn between municipalities and school boards, this Court's many cases holding school boards liable in §1983 actions are inconsistent with Monroe, especially as the principle of that case was extended to suits for injunctive relief in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507. Pp. 436 U. S. 695-696.

(b) Similarly, extending absolute immunity to school boards would be inconsistent with several instances in which Congress has refused to immunize school boards from federal jurisdiction under §1983. Pp. 436 U. S. 696-699.

(c) In addition, municipalities cannot have arranged their affairs on an assumption that they can violate constitutional rights for an indefinite period; accordingly, municipalities have no reliance interest that would support an absolute immunity. Pp. 436 U. S. 699-700.

(d) Finally, it appears beyond doubt from the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that Monroe misapprehended the meaning of the Act. Where §1983 unconstitutional as to local governments, it would have been equally unconstitutional as to state or local officers,

Page 436 U. S. 660
yet the 1871 Congress clearly intended §1983 to apply to such officers and all agreed that such officers could constitutionally be subjected to liability under §1983. The Act also unquestionably was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights. Therefore, without a clear statement in the legislative history, which is not present, there is no justification for excluding municipalities from the "persons" covered by §1983. Pp 436 U. S. 700-701.

5. Local governments sued under §1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest today's decision "be drained of meaning," Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 416 U. S. 248. P. 436 U. S. 701.

532 F.2d 259, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, III, and V of which STEVENS, J., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 436 U. S. 704. STEVENS, J., filed a statement concurring in part, post, p. 436 U. S. 714. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 436 U. S. 714.

see also: https://www.bitchute.com/video/h7fHujX11aHA/

Further Reading on the Constitutional Challenge to a Statute

See Also:

https://www.bitchute.com/video/h7fHujX11aHA/

Intro.4.3.5 Statutory Claims

The Writ of Erasure Fallacy

The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns

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